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S. R. ROSS and EDITH ROSS, his
Wife, S. R. ROSS INCORPORATED, a corporation, SIDNEY M.
HOR~fAN and JANE DOE HOR:MAN, whose true name is unknown,
his wife,
Defendants.
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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH

).IARY PARKER, Administratrix of \
of the estate of Katie C. Johnson,
sometimes known as Kate Johnson,
deceased, also known as Katie Johnson,
Plaintiff,
vs.
S. R. ROSS and EDITH ROSS, his
Wife, S. R. ROSS INCORPORATED, a corporation, SIDNEY M.
HORMAN and JANE DOE HORMAN, whose true name is unknown,
his wife,
Defendants.

Case No.

7401

Brief of Respondents
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Except as amplified in their argument, Respondents
agree with the Statement of Facts set forth in the Appellant's Brief.
1
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ARGUMENT
Appellant claims the Decree in question was void
for two reusons,. namely:
1. That the Defendant, Katie C. Johnson, was dead
prior to the commencement of the action.

2. That due diligence was not used in an attempt to
locate the Defendants in the action.
The Appellant alleges in Paragraph 3 of her Second
Amended Complaint that the action was against Katie C.
Johnson, et al, Defendants. The Affidavit for publication of Summons shows that in addition to Katie C.
Johnson ''unknown Defendants'' were also included in
the action. Record 20.
Section 104-57-10, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, permits "unknown Defendants" to be sued as such. Section
104-57-11 provdes in substance that service of Summons
may be made upon all ''unknown Defendants' by publication in the manner provided for the publication of
Sumr.aons in other civil actions, and concludes with the
following:
''and any such unkno\vn person who has or claims
to have any right, titre, estate, lien or interest in
the said property, which is a cloud on the title
thereto, adverse to the plaintiff, at the time of the
commencement of the action, who has been duly
served as aforesaid, and a.nytone claiming under
him)' shall be concluded by the judgment in such
action as effectually as if the action were bronght
against such person by his or her name, notwitlt-
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standing such unknown person may be under legal
disability." (Italics ours.)
The plaintiff in the present action is suing in her
representative capacity as Administratrix of the estate
of Katie C. Johnson, deceased. She represents the heirs
and creditors of Katie C. Johnson, deceased, who are included as ''unknown Defendants'' in the previous action
in question and are bound by the Decree made and entered therein.
So far as we are aware, Sections 104-57-10 and 10457-11 have not been construed by this Court. However
the problem involved was considered in the case of Lawrence, vs. :Murphy, 147 Pac. 903, 45 Utah 572. In the Lawrence vs. Murphy case, John W. West and Sarah A. West,
and ''unknowns'' were named as Defendants in the
action, but the Wests were dead before the suit was
commenced. Although the Court held that the attempted
publication of Summons was void under the Statute in
existence at that time, which statute was repealed in
1927, the implication is, that had the requirements of the
statute been met, the Decree would have been binding
upon the heirs of John W. West and Sarah A. West, as
unknown defendants. The Respondents therefore contend that the Plaintiff in this action is bound by the
Decree in the action in question, although Katie C. John··
son died prior to the commencement thereof.
Now, let us turn our attention to the question of
"due diligence." The Affidavit for Publication of Summons was made pursuant to Section 104-5-12, Utah Code
3
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Annoted 1943 on the ground that the Defendants could
'
'
not "after due diligence be found within the State." The
Affidavit for Publication of Summons shows the following: (Record 20, 21, 22)
Summons was placed in the hands of the Sheriff
of Salt Lake County, and the Sheriff after due search
and diligent inquiry shows in his return that he was
unable to find the Defendant.
1.

2. The records of the Salt Lake County Recorder
were searched and the address of Katie C. Johnson was
shown in a Deed on record to be Butte, Montana.
3. The tax rolls in the Salt Lake County Treasurer's
office were searched and two street addresses for Katie
C. Johnson in Butte, Montana, were found.
4. Letters were addressed to Katie C. Johnson to
the two street addresses in Butte, Montana, and also
general delivery, Butte, Montana, but no answer was received from such letters.
5. A search was made of the judgment records in
the Salt Lake County Clerk's office, the probate records
in the Salt Lake County Clerk's office, the records in
the Salt Lake County Assessor's office, the records in the
City Treasurer's office of Salt Lake City, Salt Lake City
Directory and Telephone Directory for many years, but
no information was obtained from any of the above
sources as to the whereabout of Ka6c C. Johnson.
4
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It was further alleged in the Affidavit that each of
said Defendants is a necessary and proper party Defendant to said action. And that the said Defendants can
not, after due diligence, be found within the State of
Utah.
Appellant maintains a "useless search of records in
Salt Lake County, Utah" was made and contends that
when the address of the Defendant, Katie C. Johnson in
Butte, "Jiontana, was ascertained that the search should
have continued in the State of Montana, and that by
failing to make a further search in the State of Montana
that ''due diligence'' was not used.
It seems absurd for Appellant to contend that after
an address for Defendant was ascertained in Butte,
Montana, that further search in Utah was useless. The
publication of Summons is based upon the ground that
''after due diligence the Defendant can not be found
within the State.'' That an old address for Defendant
out of the State of Utah was ascertained does not preclude the necessity of making a further search in the
State of Utah for the reason that the Defendant may
have come into the State of Utah subsequent to having
resided at the address which was ascertained outside of
the State of Utah.

Were the Court to up-hold Appellant's construction of the statute there would never be an end to the
sean·h required. In the instant case, the Appellant
cla1ms to have made inquiry in the State of Montana
and found that the Defendant, Katie C. Johnson, was
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deceased. But suppose upon inquiry Appellant learned
that Defendant had moved to some other State or
country. Then according to Appellant's theory, a search
wonld have to be made in such other State or Country,
and so on ad infinitum. Under such a construction the
statute would lose aU practical value, and title to properties would forever be in jeopardy. By no possible construction of Section 104-5-12 can it be held that the Legislature intended that the search should go beyond the
State of Utah. For as stated in the statute, a ground of
publication of Summons exists when the Defendant can
not "after due diligence be found within the State",
meaning the State of Utah.
Appellant cites no case to support her contention.
Some reference is made to the case of Liebhart vs. Lawrence, 40 Utah, 24:1 120 Pac. 215. In that ease the Affidavit was merely in the language of the statute and no
facts constituting due diligence were alleged. The assessment rol1s showed the property had heen assessed in the
name of the Defendant for certain years, and disclosed
the Defendant's address in Denver, Colorado. No copy
of the Summon or Complaint was ever mailed to the
Defendant at that address. In addition there was an element of fraud in the case, in that the Plaintiff in the
original action prevented the Defendant therein from
having his day in Court until the time within which he
might appear and object had expired. Under 1hese
circumstances, none of which exist in the C'ase now hefore
the Court, the publication of Summons was held to be
void. It was held in the Liebhart case that the acts constituting dne diligence must be alleged in the Affidavit,
()
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and further that the Clerk, or Judge who makes the
order for publication of Summons, acts judicially. The
objection to the Affidavit which existed in the Liebhart
case, that is that no facts constituting due diligence were
alleged, does not exist in the instant case, for here facts
were alleged upon which a proper judicial determination could be and was made that due diligence had been
used.
\Ve ha,·e found no case where the Affidavit was held
defective which contained facts showing as exhaustive a
search as was made in the case now before the court.
However, there are a number of cases in which the Affidavit \vas upheld where the facts relied upon for due
diligence were not nearly as exhaustive as in the instant
case. . A leading case on this question is Rue vs. Quinn,
66 Pac. 216 (Cal.) The substance of the Affidavit was as
stated in the opinion on Page 216, as follows:
"The affidavit for an order directing the
publication of summons was made by the attorney
for the plaintiff, and in it, after stating that the
surrrrnons had been placed in the hands of the
sheriff of San Diego county for service, he stated
that said sheriff had returned the same with his
return indorsed thereon to the effect that he could
not find the respondent herein in said county of
San Diego; that affiant did not know the residence of said defendant; that since said summons
was issued he had made due and diligent search
and inquiry for the said defendants, and each of
them, for the purpose of serving a summons upon
them by inquiring for each of them of several
prominent county officers (giving the names of
such officers) ; and further stated: ''I have also
madP inquiry of all other persons from whom I

7
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could expect to obtain information as to the residence or whereabouts of each of the said defendants, and after such search and inquiry and due
diligence the said deefndant, Louisa Munro cannot
be found within the state of California.''
The Court held that the Affidavit (which was made by
the attorney for the Plaintiff) was good. The entire case
should be read as it answers many of the objections of
Appellant. The following language of the court on page
217 is especially pertinent to the questions involved:
''When service is to be made in this mode
upon the ground that the defendant cannot, after
due diligence, be found, within the state, the affidavit must show two facts, viz. the exercise of due
diligence to find the defendant within the state,
and a failure to find him after the exercise of such
diligence. If either of these facts does not appear
by affidavit, the court or judge has no jurisdiction to make the order, and an order made thereon
will be insufficient to sustain a judgment based
upon such serviee. In making the· order for the
service by publication, the judge acts judicially
upon the evidence which the Code requires to be
presented to him for that purpose, and can act
upon no other evidence than such as is prescribed
by the Code. If the facts set forth in the affidavit
have a legal tendency to show the exercise of diligence on the behalf of the plaintiff in seeking to
find the defendant within the state, and that, after
the exercise of such diligence, l1e cannot be found,
the derision of the judge that the affidavit shows
the sr,me to his satisfaction is to be regarded with
the same effect as is his decision upon any other
matter of faet suhmittC'd to his judie1a1 determination. ''
8
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''There is not an entire absence of evidence
in the affidavit on behalf of the plaintiff to sustain the order, and it cannot be regarded as void.
The facts set forth therein afford some evidence
of diligence on the part of the plaintiff to find the
defendant, and also that, notwithstanding such
diligence, she could not be found within the state;
and, although the facts are based upon information of others, it cannot be said that the affidavit
is of no legal effect to- authorize the court to be
satisfied therefrom, or that it did not have a
tendency to establish both the fact of diligence
and of failure to find the defendant.
"The objections that the facts stated in the
affidavit are only hearsay, and that the inquiries
of the affiant were limited to persons in the county
of San Diego, were proper to be considered by the
judge when an application for the order was made,
for the purpose of determining whether sufficient
diligence had been employed to ascertain if the defenda;nt could be found within the state; but these
facts do not justify a disregard of his conclusion,
or render his order void. From the nature of the
question to be determined, the evidence thereon
must, to a. very great extent be hearsay, and the
number and character of the persons inquired of
must in each case be determined by the judg·e.
Diligence is in all cases a relative term and what
is due diligence must be determined by the circumstances of each case. If it should be held as an
invariable rule that inquiries should be extended
beyond the county in which the suit is pending, it
might be difficult to say which counties of the state
could be safely omitted, and unless the judge is at
liberty to determine whether the person from
1chom inquiries have been made sufficiently show
the requisite diligence, it might be necessary for
thr plaintiff to question all the citizens of the
f'ounty befo·re obtaining the order." (Italics ours.)
9
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An affidavit which the court conceded to be not as
strong as in Rue vs. Quinn, was held valid in the case of
People vs. Wrin, 76 Pac. 646 (Cal.) See also the following:
Chapman vs. Moore, 91 Pac. 324 (Cal.)
Merchant National Union vs. Buisseret, 115 Pac.
59 (Cal.) ,
Clarkin vs. Morris, 172 Pac. 981 (Cal.)
Bell vs. McDermoth, 246 Pac. 805 (Cal.)
People v. Fay, 255 Pac. 239 (Cal.)
Cases from other jurisdictions could be cited, but
the California cases, which contrue statutes substantially
like ours, are ample authority to meet the objections raised by the Appellant. Appellant has quoted from the case
of Liebhart vs. Lawrence on page 7 of her Brief, as
follows:
"The spirit and intent of the statute is to
give the non resident notice of the proceenings
against or affecting his property, if that ran be
done.''
Surely the spirit and intent of the statute, as expressed above, has been followed in this case. An exhaustive
search for the Defendant in the State of Utah was made,
as disclosed by the Affidavit before the Court. The Appellant alleged in paragraph 4 of her Second Amended
Complaint that Alice Larson, also known as Mrs. R. E.
Larson, is the sole heir of Katie C..Johnson, and that
said Alice Larson resided in Butte, ::\fontana, at thf~ time

10
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this action was filed. The Affidavit recites that Mr.
Lund caused a letter to be sent to Katie C. Johnson in
care of ~Ir. R. E. Larson, who is a son-in-law of Katie C.
JPhnson. Appellant alleges in Paragraph 7 of hell"
Second Amended Complaint that mail was caused to be
forwarded to Katie C. Johnson in care of the said R. E.
Larson, 70~ A \Vest Park, Butte, ~fontana. Respondents
demurred to the allegations of said paragraph on the
ground of uncertainty, which Demurrer was sustained.
Although the entire file of the action in question is not
before this Court, it is a reasonable assumption that the
"mail" referred to by Appellants in Paragraph 7, consisted of a Summons and Complaint in said action forwarded to Katie C. Johnson by the Clerk of the Court
pursuant to Section 104-5-13. Thus two written notices
of the existence of the claim of the Plaintiffs in the action
to the property formerly owned by Katie C. Johnson
went to the home of Alice Larson, the sole heir at law of
Katie C. Johnson. The heir of Katie C. Johnson can not
complain about not having had an opportunity to be heard
in the proceedings effecting the property in question.
Therefore in this case the requirements of the statute
with respect to publication of Summons have been met,
and furthermore, actual notice of the proceedings was
given to the heir of Katie C. Johnson. Under these circumstances the judgment of the trial Court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
ROMNEY AND BOYER,
Attorneys for Respondents.
N. R. ROSS and S. R. ROSS, Inc.
11
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